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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MANSLAUGHTER
By WmLiAm H. COLDIRON*
The purpose of this paper is to trace briefly the history of the crime
of manslaughter from the time of Bracton to the present day For con-
venience, the period covered will be divided into two parts, being more
or less the periods into which the subject falls historically The first
period covers the three centuries between Bracton and Coke, while
the second period extends from Coke to the present time. The divid-
ing line between the two periods is drawn here because by Coke's
time manslaughter, in its modern sense, had emerged as a branch of
the law of homicidei and from Coke's time to the present day, the
history of manslaughter, as well as murder, has been concerned prin-
cipally with the interpretation of "malice aforethought."2  The first
period will deal with the work of Bracton and Coke and the various
statutes that affected the crime of manslaughter with minor reference
to Staundforde and Lambard. The second period will deal with the
development and refinement of manslaughter as a separate branch of
the law of homicide as indicated by the works of Hale, Foster and
Stephen and certain minor commentators as compared with the present
law of manslaughter as set out by Prof. Perkins in a recent article.
3
A brief sketch of the early background of the law of homicide in
England is necessary before the lav as set out by Bracton can be
understood. In Bracton's time, all homicide was divided into three
large classes: first, justifiable homicide, which was killing in the execu-
tion of legal punishment; second, excusable homicide which was killing
by misadventure or self-defense, which was felonious but subject to
pardon by the king as a matter of grace; and third, all other homicides,
all of which were felonious. 4 Justifiable homicide played little or no
part in the development of manslaughter and need not be considered
further. While manslaughter in its modem sense grew almost wholly
out of the third class of homicides, the second class is so closely inter-
woven with the early history of felonious homicide, that generally the
two classes cannot be treated separately
From a very early date all homicides were treated from a purely
* A.B. 1938, Morehead State College; LL.B. 1947, University of Kentucky. Mem-
ber of Kentucky Bar. Member of faculty Montana State University School of Law,
Missoula, Mont.
HOLDSWORTi-n, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (3d ed. 1923) 314 note 3.
Sayre, Mens Rea (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 974 at 997.
3 Perkins, The Law of Homicide (1946) JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRuMI-
NOLOGY 391.
'2 POLLOCK and MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1911) 485; Perkins,
.1 Re-examination of Malice Aforethought (1934) 43 YALe L. J. 537 at 541.
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objective point of view 5 and punishment was not for the crine as we
think of it today but was for revenge of the km of the deceased. 'Homi-
cide subjected the slayer to blood feud at the hands of the deceased's
kindred, but the wrong against such kindred might be remedied by a
money payment to the kindred known as bot or wer, and the wrong to
the king for the loss of hIs subject could be remedied by payment of
a fine to the king known as wite.6 But even m these early times, if the
slayer could show that the homicide was by misadventure or self-
defense, he might remedy his wrong by payment of the wer without
the wite.7 Whether the origin of these concessions to slayers by mis-
adventure comes from the Mosaic law through the laws of Alfred,
or is Germanic in origin" does not concern us here, but it does show
53 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883) 24-25.
6 POLLOCK and MAITLAND, Op. cit. supra note 4 at 451. See also, HALE, PL-EAS
OF THE CROWN (Edition of 1778) 7-9 for a detailed discussion of the rates of wcr
which were assessed according to the rank of the slain man.
"It cannot but seem strange to us at this time of day, that the wilful murder
of any one, much more the king, should be punished only with a pecuniary mulct:
to solve this difficulty, Mr. Rapin supposes that this commutation was allowed only
in the case of simple homicide; or at most what is now known as manslaughter, but
not in the case of premeditated murder: See Rapin's Historic d'Angletere, Vol. I,
p. 520."
HALE, op. cit. 8, note (g).
Sayre, op. cit. supra note 2 at 982.
8The Jewish law of homicide is set out in Exodus XXI, 12-36.
"12. He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be surely put to death.
13. And if a man lie not in wait, but God deliver him into his hand: then I
will appoint thee a place whither he shall flee.
14. But if a man come presumptously upon his neighbor, to slay hin with guile:
thou shalt take him from mine altar, that he may die."
The places of refuge for a man who kills but not by lying in wait are provided
for in Numbers XXXV 6-34.
"6. Among the cities which )e shall give unto the Levites there shall be six
cities of refuge, which ye shall appoint for the manslayer, that the man flee
thither:
11. Then ye shall appoint you cities to be cities of refuge for you: that the
slaver may flee thither, which killeth any person at unaware.
25. And the congregation shall deliver the slayer out of the hand of the revenger
of blood, and the congregation shall restore him to the city of his refuge, whither
lie was fled: and he shall abide in it unto the death of the high priest, which was
annointed with the oly oil.
26. But if the slayer at any time come without the border of the city of his
refuge, whither he was fled;
27. And the revenger of blood find him without the borders of the city of his
refuge, and the revenger of blood kill the slayer; he shall not be guilty of blood:
28. Because he should have remained in the city of his refuge until the death
of the high priest; but after his death the slayer shall return into the land of his
possession."
Deuteronomy IV, 41-42:
"41. Then Moses severed three cities on this side of Jordan towards the sun-
rising;
42. That the slayer might flee thither, which should kill his neighbor unawares.
and hated him not in time past: and that fleeing unto one of these cities might live."
The quotation from Exodus given above was set out in the laws of Alfred.
See 3 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 5 at 24.
HALE credits the system of wer to the northern nations. See: HALE, op. cit.
supra note 6 at 7 n. (c).
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that even though the early judges could not separate the physical
element of homicide from the physical elements, they did recognize
that there were degrees of guilt. This fact is further emphasized by
the tendency to show leniency to small children who were not under
all circumstances held liable for homicide.9
Toward the other extreme of the law of homicide were secret
slaymgs, by ambush, waylaying, or secret methods. "Morth" was the
word used to describe all secret crimes and was not confined to
homicides alone.10 "Morth-works" would be of no particular interest
here were it not for the fact that our modem word "murder" has its
origin here. "Morth" in its Latinized form, "murdrum" came to be
synonymous with secret killing which was always considered a heinous
crime."  This was brought about by the fact that "murdrurn" was the
name which designated the fine levied on the hundred if a foreigner
was killed in their midst. The origin of the murdrum fine is not too
well settled. One explanation of this fine is that after the Danish
invasion Cnut levied such a fine on any hundred when a Dane was
found dead, it being presumed that any foreigner who was found dead
had been secretely killed by the English. After the Norman Conquest,
William I adopted this system to protect Frenchmen from secret as-
saults by the English.'2 The hundred might be relieved of the pay-
ment of this fine by the presentment of Englishry, that is, they could
show the slain man was English, not a foreigner.' 3  There is some
question as to whether the hundred would be relieved if the killer
could be named or produced, but that need not be considered here.
In certain sections of England, the hundred was assessed the "mur-
drum" fine even though the death was accidental but this had been
at least partially abolished by Bracton's time.'
4
By the latter part of the twelfth century, one who had killed by
misadventure or in self-defense, was guilty of felonious homicide and
was subject to appeal or indictment for the killing. But if it were
shown that the killing was by per mfortunium or in self-defense, it
would entitle the slayer to a pardon from the king as a matter of
grace. " While a pardon from the king would save the accused's life and
2 POLLOCK and MAITLAND. op. cit. supra, note 4 at 484.
"3 STLI'HEN. op. cit. supra note 5 at 25.
BAMFs, A TRINSLATION OF GLANVILLE (1900) 285-288.
' 'HALE, Op. cit. supra note 6 at 447-448; I MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPARS (1911)
230-246; 2 POLLOCK and MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 4 at 487, Sayre, op. cit. supra
note 2 at 995, n. 75; Yntema, Lex Murdrorum (1922) 36 HARV. L. REv. 146.
"3 HoLnsWoRTH, op. cit. supra, note I at 314; 3 STEPHEN, op. Cit. supra note 5
at 31.
112 POLLOCK and MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 4 at 487.
1 2 POLLOCK and MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 4 at 479-480.
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limb, it would not prevent his goods from being forfeited, 10 nor would
it save hn from suit by the relatives of the deceased for bot in pay-
ment for their loss.
1 7
With these few comments as a very general background, we turn
to the work of Bracton. As has been noted, in the thirteenth century
when Bracton was writing, the mental element accompanying the
criminal act played little part in the determination of the guilt of the
accused. But two influences were at work in the common law which
were to eventually make the mental element the primary factor in
determining criminal liability in homicide; these were the Roman law
and the canon law 8 Bracton was deeply influenced by these ele-
ments and his work reflects more of the canon and Roman law than
actually existed in England in his time.19 Bracton divided homicide
into corporal and spiritual and then divided corporal homicide into
four classes: (1) justifiable, in the administration of justice; (2) by
misadventure; (3) by necessity; (4) by desire .20 While it is admitted
by Bracton that one who kills by misadventure or in self-defense is
guilty of felonious homicide under the common law in his time, and
that the accused's only hope for mercy was a pardon by grace of the
king, this did not reflect Bracton's feelings on the subject. He talks
of "homicide, if it be done from malignity or through delight in shed-
ding human blood";2 1 of what "we must consider with the mind or
with what intent a thing is done;"2 2 which indicates that in Bracton's
opinion the psychical element was entering the law It is doubtful if
the state of the common law justified Bracton's statements from the
canonists at the time they were made, but they had such a marked
influence on the later development of the law of homicide that they
have proved more important than statements of the actual existing
law of that time.
Between Bracton and Staundforde there was no commentator on
" Coke: Third Institute (6th ed. 1680) 57. There is some disagreement as to
the forfeiture of goods in the case of pardon for homicide by misadventure or in
self-defense. See: 2 POLLOcK and MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 4 at 481.
17 3 HOLDSWOtRTH, op. cit. supra note 1 at 312.
18 Sayre, op. cit. supra note 2 at 982-983.
19 3 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 5 at 28-29; Sayre, op. cit. supra note 2 at 985.
See: 8 SELD. Soc. (1895) Ix-xxxiii.
'- 3 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 5 at 29. Bracton also had a division of corporal
homicide denoted homicide lingua the meaning of which is very obscure. Stephen
points out that he does not know the meaning of this division. It is to be noted
that Bracton took his analysis of homicide from Bernard of Pavia, a great canonist.
See also, 2 PoLLOCK and MAITLAND, op. Cit. supra note 4 at 477" and Sayre, op. cit.
supra note 2 at 984.
"Sayre, op. cit. supra note 2 at 984-986.
'Ibid.
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the law of homicide,2 3 so we must turn to such sources as are available,
principally the cases and the statutes, to trace the history of homicide
through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
Beginning in the latter part of the thirteenth century and continuing
well into the sixteenth century, a series of statutes were passed which
vitally affected the law of homicide. The first of these statutes to be
noted was the Statute of Marlbridge24 in 1267 which abolished the
"murdrum" fine on the hundred if the death was occasioned by mis-
adventure. 2 - Although Bracton had pointed out that the levy of the
fine in case of misadventure had fallen into disuse in certain sections
of the country, this statute gave official sanction to the custom and
indicates a weakening of the severity of the common law
Close on the heels of the Statute of Marlbridge came the Statute
of Gloucester2 in 1278 which reformed the procedure for securing
pardons. This Statute required the jurors to return a verdict of mis-
adventure or self-defense when the evidence indicated such was the
case, and the justices would then report to the king, who would issue
the pardon as a matter of grace.27 This was merely a forerunner to
the later procedure by which pardons were granted as a matter of
course in such cases. The wording of pardons is of particular inter-
est in that it was here that "malice aforethought," as a legal term, came
into common usage. To distinguish pardonable homicide from other
homicides, the pardon would recite that the homicide was not with
"malice aforethought" but was the result of misadventure or in self-
defense. '-" The exact meaning of the phrase "malice aforethought"
even at this time was not definite, and it probably meant no more
than intentional wrongdoing,29 but distinguished ordinary homicide
from homicide by ambush, waylaying, and with evil intent.
At this time there were no degrees of punishment for felonious
homicide. Whether the slayer killed by the most heinous method or
3 STrPHEN, op. cit. supra note 5 at 34.
2152 Hen. I, C. 25.
- A misinterpretation of this statute by Coke and others led to a mistaken be-
lief that prior to this time one who killed by misadventure or in self-defense, was
hung. But this mistake has now been rectified and it is now settled that this stat-
ute merely abolished the "murdrum" fine sn cases of misadventure and self-defense.
HALF, op. cit. supra note 6 at 425; FOSTER, CROWN LAW (2d ed. 1791) 283-285;
IN' BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (lth ed. 1760) 188. See: 7 SELD. Soc. (1895) 135-136.
: 6 Edw. I, C. 9.
2 POLLOCK and MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 4 at 481, Perkins, op. cit. Supra
note 4 at 540.
2 POLLOCK and MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 4 at 467-469; 3 STEPHEN, op. Cit.
supra note 5 at 41.
-' 3 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 5 at 38-39; Perkins, op. cit. supra note 4 at 545.
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upon sudden, violent provocation, his punishment was death, usually
by hanging.30 The most dastardly murderer and the slayer of one
apprehended in the act of adultery with the slayer's wife were on the
same footing, and each equally entitled to benefit of clergy 31
By 1300 most of the Norman invaders had been absorbed by the
English people and the presentment of Englishry had fallen into disuse.
Therefore, in 1340 this fact was recognized by the statute of 14 Edw
1II, st. 1, C.4 which abolished the presentment of Englishry officially
With the passage of this Act the technical difference between volun-
tary homicide and "murder" was abolished.3 - But "murdrum" con-
tinued in the law, not to indicate a technical fine, but to distinguish
secret slayings by ambush, by waylaying, and by other foul means,
from other types of felonious homicides. Thus, one more step in the
break between murder and manslaughter was complete.
Stephen suggests that the next landmark in the course of the di-
vision between murder and manslaughter is the statute 13 Rich. II,
s.2 C.1 in 1889 in which he contends that statutory recognition was
given to "malice aforethought" for the first time.3 3  Even though this
contention is correct, it is unimportant because it has been overlooked
or ignored by most of the writers whose work have had the greatest
influence in the law of homicide.
3 4
There seems to have been a lull in the development of the law
of homicide during most of the fifteenth century The law had pro-
gressed little since Bracton. All persons accused of felonious homicidc
were still treated equally so far as punishment and benefit of clergy
were concerned. Pardons in the cases of misadventure and self-
defense by the end of the fifteenth century had probably become a
matter of course rather than a matter of grace with the king, but
pardons were still necessary 35 Even though a pardon would save the
life and limb of a slayer by misadventure or in self-defense, his goods
were still forfeited. 36 The practice of forfeiture of goods in the case
of excusable homicide was not abolished until the statute of 9 Geo.
IV C.31, sec. 10, in 1828, although it had fallen into disuse before
that time.
37
30 Perkins, op. cit. supra note 4 at 541-543.
31Ibid
: 3 STEPHEN, Op. cit. supra note 5 at 40.
' 3 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 5 at 42-43; REPORT OF NEWV YORK LAW REVISION
COMMInSSION FOR 1937 (1937) 536.
"3 STEPHEN, op cit. supra note 5 at 43.
'2 POLLOCK and MAITLAND, Op. cit. supra note 4 at 481.
Ibid.
3- 2 POLLOCK and MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 4 at 481, n. 3.
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At the end of the fifteenth and in the first half of the sixteenth cen-
tury came a rapid and definite break between murder and man-
-daughter. This break was effected by the enactment of four statutes
which ousted the benefit of clergy in the case of homicide with "malice
aforethought." These statutes, 12 Hen. VII, C.7 (1496); 4 Hen. VIII
C.2 (1512); 23 Hen. VIII C.1, sec. .3, 4 (1581); and 1 Edw VI C.12,
see. 10 (1547) provided that offenses which were described as "mur-
der upon malice prepensed," "murder of malice prepensed," "wilful
prepensed murders," and "prepensedly murders" were excluded from
the benefit of clergy, thus making a definite distinction between ordi-
nary culpable homicide and the more aggravated type described as
"murder" or "murder of malice prepensed."38 The word "man-
slaughter" as the word descriptive of culpable homicide less than
murder or homicides not aggravated by ambush, lying in wait, or
malice prepensed had not yet made its appearance in the law 9 These
statutes are generally conceded to mark the break in the law of
homicide which created the two divisions of murder and manslaugh-
ter,4"' but it could hardly be said that the various refinements which
enter into present-day distinction were complete at tlus time. To
bring forth the distinction as it exists in its modem sense required the
work of three great writers, Staunforde, Lambard, and Coke, whose
work followed soon after the enactment of these statutes.
Prior to Staundforde, there had never been a treatise of any note
dealing solely with criminal law 4i and his Pleas of the Crown, pub-
lished in 156042 was hardly more than a repetition of Bracton.
Staundforde should be noted particularly because he divided or con-
trasted "homicide par chance medley" and "homicide par voy de
murder."43 In the phrase "chance medley" lie the roots of the present-
(lay elements of "sudden heat and passion" and provocation which
were later to distinguish manslaughter from murder and which are
a blight on the law of manslaughter similar to the even more am-
a Perkins, op. cit. supra note 4 at 543-544.
' j 3 HOLDSWORTIH, loc. cit. note 1.
I Rn'oRT OF NEW YORK LAW REvisION COMMISSION FOR 1937 at 536-537 states:
"The result (of these statutes) was a division of culpable homicides into two
groups; murder punishable by death and comprised of homicides committed by
lvytng si wait, assault, or malice prepensed, and all other homicides, later termed
manslaughter, punishable as to those who claim benefit of clergy by a slight burn
of the hand and short imprisonment."
See also: 3 STEmiN. OJp. cit. supra note 5 at 44-45; Perkins. op. cit. supra note 4
at 513-544.
413 Sifr, rEN, op. cit. supra note 5 at 46.
"'3 HOLDSWORTI, op. cit. supra note 1 at 314 n. 3 states that Staundforde's book
was published in 1560, but Sayre, op. cit, supra note 4 at 992 n. 60 gives the date
as 1557.
1- 3 HOLDSWORTH, loc. cit. note 1.
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biguous phrase "malice aforethought" in the law of murder. It is
interesting to note that Staundforde thought that the meaning of
"malice prepensed" was so well settled as not to require an ex-
planation.
44
In 1604, the famous Stabbing Statute45 which was to cause much
comment by later writers46 was enacted. Treatment of this statute by
the courts is most interesting. Parliament, by this statute, attempted
to throw the law of homicide back to its old severity by making a cer-
tain set of circumstances a conclusive presumption of "malice afore-
thought." The courts refused to allow the trend of the lav to be
reversed, and by strict construction of the statute deprived it of its
severity It is generally agreed that this statute was an attempt to
make a crime of murder, with malice prepensed, out of circumstances
which might only justify a conviction of "chance medley" This was
an important distinction at this time because murder with malice pre-
pensed had been ousted of the benefit of clergy by the above-men-
tioned statutes and thus a conviction for that crime meant death. But
"chance medley" or other homicides were clergyable and called only
for a branding on the brawn of the thumb and imprisonment for the
maximum of one year.
4 7
Lambard was the next writer, and his work is of interest here only
in that he states that former malice will be imputed to one who kills
"suddenly without any outward show of present quarrel or offense."4 s
This would indicate that killing during a present quarrel would not be
malicious but only chance medley Thus, sudden quarrel is emerging
as sufficient provocation to reduce what otherwise would be murder
with malice aforethought to chance medley-or manslaughter. Stated
in another way, homicide provoked by sudden quarrel was not aggra-
44Foster thought that Staundforde was the clearest and best writer of Crown
Law before Hale. FosTER,.op. cit. supra note 25 at 303. This is interesting because
Coke has had far greater influence in the law than the comparatively unknown
Staundforde. 3 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 5 at 54 credits much of Coke's influence
to the fact that he wrote with an air of authority.
51 Jac. I, C.8. The statute provided that anyone who stabbed another "on the
sudden" when the person stabbed had not drawn a weapon or had not struck a
blow, and the person stabbed died in six months after the stabbing, "although it
cannot be proved that the same was done of Malice forethought shall suffer
Death as in the case of wilful Murder."
The statute was occasioned by the fact that frequent stabbings occurred be-
tween the Scotch and the English at the accession of James I. IV BLACKSIONE, op.
cit. supra note 25 at 193.
48 FosTE, op. cit. supra note 25 at 297-302; HALE, Op. cit. supra note 6 at 467-470.
47 3 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 5 at 46; Perkins, op. cit. supra note 4 at 544,
Sayre, op. cit. supra note 2 at 996-997.
" 3 STEPHEN, Op. cit. supra note 5 at 50,
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vated by circumstances sufficient to raise simple culpable homicide to
the non-clergyable offense of murder with malice aforethought.
Coke's Third Institute, published in 1628, marks the end of our
first period. At this time, the word "manslaughter" had entered the
law to designate a division of the law of homicide. In distinguishing
between murder and manslaughter, Coke said:
"Some manslaughters be voluntary, and not of malice
forethought, upon sudden falling out And this for distinction
sake is called manslaughter. There is no difference between mur-
der and manslaughter, but the one is upon malice forethought, and
the other upon a sudden occasion: and therefore is called chance-
medley.'
In giving a definition of chance medley, he states;
"Nota, Homicide is called chancemedley, or chancemelle,
for that it is done by chance (without premeditation) upon a sudden
brawle, shuffling, or contention: for meddle or melle (as some say)
is an ancient French word, and signifieth brawle, or contention
So as killing of a man by chance-medley, is killing of a man upon
sudden brawle or contention by chance."
Thus, it would seem in Coke's time that manslaughter was limited
to killing upon sudden quarrel or falling out. Coke cited the follow-
ing example:
"As if two meet together, and striving for the wall the
one kill the other, this is manslaughter and felony. And so it is,
if they had upon that sudden occasion gone into the fields and fought,
and the one had killed the other; this (as hath been said) had been
but manslaughter, and no murder; because all that followed, was
but a continuance of the first sudden occasion, and the heat of blood
kindled by ire was never cooled, till blow was given
Here, for the first time in the writer's search, is cooling-time men-
tioned. This element is to play an important part in the future de-
velopment of manslaughter and it is to be noted that Coke gave no
definition of cooling time, nor did he attempt a test for it. It is diffi-
cult to say whether cooling time was an established element of man-
slaughter before Coke's time or whether it was an innovation with
him. As pointed out by Stephen, Coke speaks with an air of authority,
but many of his statements must be accepted with caution. 2
In giving his three examples of implied malice, Coke lists as the
first case, "As if one killeth another without any provocation of the
part of him that is slam, the law implieth malice "53 But Coke
' COKE, op. cit. supra note 16 at 55.
t'CoKE, op. cit. supra note 16 at 57.
M COKE. op. cit. supra note 16 at 55.
Z" 3 STiTH'EN, op. cit. supra note 5 at 54.
r3 COKE, op. cit. supra note 16 at 52,
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does not give a definition or examples of extent of provocation.
Shephen suggests that provocation was limited to affrays involving
the use of weapons carried by all men m those days or at least Coke's
writings seem to be confined to such cases.
54
Thus we see that by the middle of the seventeenth century, man-
slaughter had emerged as a separate branch of the law of homicide.
At this time manslaughter was the killing of one upon sudden provo-
cation, provocation apparently limited to sudden affray or chance
medley, before there had been sufficient tune for the blood to cool.
It was a clergyable felony for which the prescribed punishment was
the branding of the letter "M" on the thumb and imprisonment for
one year.r 5
In discussing the second period no attempt will be made to trace
the history of manslaughter, as a branch of the law of homicide, as
has been done in the first period, but we will take the major elements
of the law of manslaughter separately and attempt to show the
writers on criminal law during the period. Hale,56 Foster,57 Stephen,-'s
and Perkins5" have been selected as the principal authors although
the writer is not unmindful of Hawkin, East, Bishop, Wharton and
others who have been influential in the field of criminal law A brief
discussion of the analysis of manslaughter by each of these commenta-
tors is necessary in order to appreciate the nature of the comparisons
here attempted.
Hale demonstrated, unconsciously, that manslaughter is a catch
all term which is used to label all homicides which are not murder,
but which are not excusable or justifiable. One chapter is entitled
Of homicide, and its several kinds, and first of these considerations
that are applicable, as well to murder as manslaughter,"60 and another
is called "Of Manslaughter , but even here he could not separ-
ate manslaughter from another element, the Stabbing Statute. Else-
where Hale deals with manslaughter in connection with other subjects
such as accessories,6 2 involuntary homicide and per infortunium,°
3 kill-
84 3 STEPHEN, Op. cit. supra note 5 at 59.
6I STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND (1883) 463-464.
Ge HALE, op. cit. supra note 6
FOSTER, op. cit. supra note 25.
5 STEPHEN, DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1877).
r PERKINS, op. cit. supra note 3.
11 HALE , op. cit. supra note 6 at 424.
61 HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 466.
62 HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 435.
6 HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 471.
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gestures 94 alone, however apporbrious, have never constituted provoca-
ing by necessity and in self-defense, 64 and forfeiture. 5 The law as it
existed in his day must be gleaned from the various cases in which
he differentiates between manslaughter and self-defense, manslaughter
and murder, manslaughter and per infortunium, and like comparisons.
Foster has a separate chapter on manslaughter in which he divides
provocation into five sections. 0 But Foster closely follows Hale and
much of the law of manslaughter will be found in the chapters dealing
with murder17 and misadventure." Foster repeats many of Hale's
cases, but adds several of his own.
Stephen does not attempt a critical analysis of manslaughter similar
to that he made of murder. He deals with manslaughter pnncipally
in distinguishing it from murder, 69 but he does set out several examples
of provocation by way of definition of that term.70 Shephen com-
inents briefly on Coke, Hale, and Foster"i and gives credit to East and
Russell for their collection of cases on the subject. On the whole
Stephen's work on manslaughter seems to be little more than a con-
densation or annotation of Russell's collection of cases, -7 2 and very
unsatisfactory when compared to his analysis of murder.
Perkins in his article attempts a more or less detailed analysis of
the law of manslaughter 73 and his citations are to modern cases rather
than a mere repetition of the worn examples of Coke and Hale. The
more detailed analysis is a substitute for the mass of cases given by the
earlier writers, but there is a striking similarity between much of the
language used by Hale and that used by Perkins.
' HALF., op. cit. supra note 6 at 478.
HALE, 01p. cit. supra note 6 at 492.
FoSTER, op. cit. supra note 25 at 290-297.
FoS.ER, op. cit. supra note 25 at 307.
FOSTER, op. cit. supra note 25 at 258.
"STS1PHEN, op. cit. supra note 58 at 161, 380-394.
70SI IHEN, Op. cit. supra note 58 at 164-168.
The majority of the cases from which Stephen takes his rules may be found in
Hale or Foster and actually add little to what had already been said by these writers.
7 5
STE.PHEN, op. cit. supra note 58 at 383.
by showing that my definition of murder and manslaughter respectively,
will be found, upon examination, to be equivalent to what is stated in Coke's 3d
Institute, Chapters VII and VIII, 1 Hales Pleas of the Crown, pp. 411-502 (Chapters
XXXI-XLII, both inclusive), and Foster's Discourse on Homicide (Crown Law,
255-337). The existing law on the subject is found mainly on these words, and the
almost innumerable decisions bearing upon the subject are all applications of the
theory which is there laid down."
'STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 5 at 79.
Stephen seems to admit as much when he stated, "I have reduced the law upon
the subject homicide to the form of propositions which will be found in my Digest,
ii which also will be found an account of the vast mass of cases collected in Russell
on Crimes, showing how all of them find their place under the various propositions
into which I have condensed the law.
SPerkins, op. cit, supra note 3 at 410-433.
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No attempt will be made to trace the development of manslaughter
into the voluntary and involuntary classifications at this point other
than to note that during Coke's time all manslaughter was voluntary
because it included only one category, that of homicide initiated by
chance medley or sudden affray which involved a voluntary slaying.
By Hale's time there was a distinction between voluntary and invol-
untary manslaughter 4 and this distinction will be separaterly con-
sidered.
Perkins says, "An intentional homicide in a sudden rage of passion
engendered by adequate provocation, and not the result of malice con-
ceived before the provocation, is voluntary manslaughter."-, The con-
trolling element in the present day law of manslaughter thus appears
to be "adequate provocation," so let us turn back the clock to the time
of Hale and see how the present day rule of provocation was evolved.
Hale does not state how great the provocation must be in order to
mitigate homicide, otherwise murder, to manslaughter. He merely
states that manslaughter is homicide not aggravated by malice, express
or implied,76 and then proceeds to give cases wherein manslaughter
may be distinguished from murder. But Foster recognizes that there
must be sufficient provocation to cause a man to act from passion
rather than reason.7 7 His statement that "The indulgence shown to the
first transport of passion in these cases is plainly a condescension to
the frailty of the human frame, to the furor brevs, which, while the
frenzy lasteth, rendereth the man deaf to the voice of reason," 8 is the
classic statement of the effect of adequate provocation. 79 Perkins
merely paraphrases, more or less, Foster's statement and states that
the heat of passion aroused by the provocation need not be so great
that the slayer did not know what he was doing, but "that for the
moment his action is being directed by passion rather than by
74 HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 466.
"Manslaughter, or simple homicide, is the voluntary killing without malice
express or implied, and differs not in substance of the fact from murder, but only
differs sn these ensuing circumstances."
HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 471.
"Involuntary homicide is the death or hurt of the person of a man against or
besides the will of him that kills him.
"And in these cases, to speak once for all, the indictment itself must find the
matter, or in case the indictment be of murder or manslaughter, and upon the trial
it appears to the jury it was involuntary the jury ought to find the special
matter,
7r Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 412.
7a HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 466.
77 FosTER, op. cit. supra note 25 at 296.
8 Id. at 315.
1 RUSSELL, TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS (7th American ed., from
the 3d London ed. 1853) 513, repeats the statement verbatim. See also, III BLCK-
STONE, 017. cit. supra note 25 at 191; 1 EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1806) 232.
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reason."8 ° Thus it seems that the adequacy of the provocation neces-
sary to reduce murder to manslaughter has not changed since the time
of Foster. Whether the adequacy of provocation was to be measured
by an objective or subjective test did not seem to concern the early
writers, but the language of the numerous cases cited by them 81
would justify Perkin's statement that the test is objective.8 2
From the time of Coke it has been necessary that the provocation
rises suddenly"' so as to refute any idea that the homicide was the
result of any preconceived malice. The best discussions of this prob-
lem come in consideration of accessories before the fact by the earlier
writers.8 4 Foster s statement as to suddenness of the provocation is a
good statement of the law as it existed then and today "The provoca-
tion therefore which extenuateth in the case of homicide must be
something which the man is conscious of, which he feeleth and re-
senteth at the instant the fact which he would extenuate is committed,
not what time or accident may afterwards bring to light.8
5
Closely connected with the problem of the suddenness of the pro-
vocation is the problem of "cooling time." As has been indicated,
Coke made the first reference to cooling time to be found by the
writer. Coke's example of sudden affray and the statement of the
lack of cooling time was repeated by Hale,80 who added Royley's
Case87 as another example of test of cooling time. These two cases
have been the standard illustrations from Hale to Stephen when the
problem of cooling time was being consideredss As in the case of
Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 423.
Rex. v. Mawgridge, Kel. 119, 81 Eng. Rep. 1107 (1707); Grey's Case, Kel. 64,
81 Eng. Rep. 1084 (1666).
12 Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 423.
" CoRE, op. cit. supra note 16 at 55.
"And so it is, if they had upon sudden that occasion gone into the fields and
fought, and the one had killed the other: this had been but man-
slaughter,
HALL, op. cit. supra note 6 at 437.
"In manslaughter there can he no accessories as before the fact, for it is pre-
sunmed to le sudden, for if it were with advice, command, or deliberation, it is mur-
der and not manslaughter, and the like of se dejendendo."
See also, IV BLACKStONE, op. cit. supra note 25 at 36.
' FOSTER, Op. cit. supra note 25 at 315.
1 HALF, op. cit. supra note 6 at 453.
' 12 Co. 87" Cre. Jac. 296; 79 Eng. Rep. 254 (1611).
"Two boys fought and one of them who was beaten, and had got a bloody nose,
ran home to his father, and complained of what had happened. The father imme-
diately ran to the place three quarters of a mile distant, and after he had called
the ioy with whom his son had been fighting, villian, and used some other appro-
brious terms, he struck him a single blow on the head, and it afterwards occasioned
his death. He was tried, and a special verdict was found; and upon its being
brought to the King's Bench, 9 Jac. it was held that he was guilty of manslaughter,
because done in sudden heat and passion."
Brief of the case quoted from BFViLL, HOIicIDE (1799) 73.
" FosTmi . op. cit. supra note 25 at 294; EAST, op .cit. supra note 79 at 252-253;
STI-11pLN, op. cit. supra note 58 at 163, n. 1; 166.
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adequacy of provocation and the suddenness of provocation Foster
seems to have the best statement of the law of cooling time when he
stated, " and indeed in every other case of homicide upon pro-
vocation how great soever it be, if there is sufficient time for passion
to subside, and for reason to interpose, such homicide will be mur-
der." 9 The similarity between the language of this rule and the rule
stated by Perkins is striking.90
Having thus noted that there has been little or no change in the
four major elements of the rule of provocation, that is, adequacy of
provocation, heat of passion, suddenness of provocation, and cooling
time, since the time of Hale, let us now consider what acts constituted
adequate provocation during this period. The old term chance medley
covered the whole field of sudden contention or brawl according to
Coke's definition.91 This term was probably too broad to satisfy the
common law ]udges and the term lost much of its strength in being
misinterpreted and confused.92 In order to allow for some degrees of
provocation, chance medley was laid aside, and a series of rules based
on cases grew up to form the law of provocation based on sudden
affray An affray occurs when two persons meet; words and gestures
pass between them; then words and an assault ensues; then a battery;
,and then a combat develops. Whether a homicide is murder or man-
slaughter depends on when in this chain of events the fatal blow was
struck. Where along this chain of events there was sufficient provoca-
tion engendered was the question to be decided. Hale set out the law
and since that time there has been little or no change. Words"'3 and
1 FOSTER, op. cit. supra note 25 at 296.
10 Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 423.
"No matter how extreme the provocation, or how great the passion engendered
thereby, there will be no mitigation sufficient to reduce voluntary homicide to man-
slaughter in the absence of another requirement That is, the fatal act must
have followed the provocation before there had been a reasonabl opportunity for
the passion of the slayer to cool."
" COKE, 10c. cit. note 48.
2 
FOSTER, op. cit. supra note 25 at 258.
"Homicide occasioned by Accident, which human Prudence could not foresee or
prevented, improperly called Chance-medley."
IV BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 25 at 184.
"But the self-defense, which we are now speaking of, is that whereby a man
may protect himself from an assault, or the like in the course of a sudden brawl
or quarrel, by killing him who assaults him. And this is what the law expresses
by the word chance-medley, or (as some rather choose to write it) chaud.medlev;
the former of which in its etymology signifies a casual affray, the latter an affray in
heat of blood or passion; both of them of pretty much the same import; but the
former is in common speech too often erroneously applied to any manner of hiomi-
cide by misadventure;
w HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 456; FoSTER, op. cit. supra note 25 at 290;
STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 58 at 165; Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 419,
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tion sufficient to mitigate murder to manslaughter. But if the words
expressed an intention to do bodily harm95 or were accompamed by
some act which constituted an assault, however slight, there might be
sufficient provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter.90 If the
niffray reached a stage where an assault by one of the parties occurred,
real difficulties arose. It is doubtful whether less than an aggravated
assault was adequate provocation in Hale's time, but an assault accom-
panied by a battery, a blow sufficient to kindle the blood,97 (a slight
blow was not enough)9' was adequate provocation to reduce murder
to manslaughter. If the affray reached the stage of mutual combat be-
fore the fatal blow was struck it was almost universally held to be no
more than manslaughter." ' Since in the time of Hale and Foster most
" HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 455, citing Brain's Case, Cro. Eliz. 778, Kel. 131;
FoS~IR, op. cit. supra note 25 at 290; STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 58 at 165; Perkins,
op. cit. supra note 3 at 421.
HALE. op. cit. supra note 6 at 456.
but it was there held, that words of menace of bodily harm would come
ut ilhn the reason of such provocation, as would make the offense to be but man-
slaugh ter."
Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 420.
"Adequate provocation may sometimes lx established by a combination of in-
suliting words with some other circumstance which would not itself be sufficient.
For example, insulting words plus a blow too slight for provocation, and the same
is true of insulting words plus aggravated trespass to property."
"SrtPiLN. op. cit. supra note 58 at 165-166; RUSSELL, op. cit. supra note 79 at
3811581.
1 Stedinau's Case, Old Bailey, MSS Tracy and Denton (1704).
"There being an affray in the street, one Stedynan a foot soldier ran hastil)
touard the combatants. A woman seeing him run ii that manner cried out, 'You
will not murdcr the man will you?' Stedman replied, "What is that to you, you
bich?' The wonian thereupon gave him a box on the ear, and Stedman struck her
on the breast with the pommel of his sword. The woman then fled, and Stedman
pursuing her stabbed her in the back. Holt was first of the opinion, that this was
murder, a single box on the ear from a women not being sufficient provocation to
hill in this manner, after he had given her a blow in return for the box on the ear;
and it was proposed to have the matter found specially. But it afterwards appear-
ing in the progress of the trial, that the woman struck the soldier in the face with
an iron pattern, and drew a great deal of blood, it was holden clearly to be no more
than manslaughter.
.lie smart of the man s wound, and the effusion of blood might possibly keep
Is indignation boiling to the moment of fact."
This abstract of the case is from FosaER, op. cit. supra note 25 at 292.
' Ibid.
Sec also, EAsr, op. cit. supra note 79 at 234-235; RUSSELL, op. cit. supra note 79
,at 580-581.
I" HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 452-453; FosTER, op. cit. supra note 25 at 295;
Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 415; RUSSELL, op. cit. supra note 79 at 527, 585.
EST, op. cit. supra note 79 at 241.
" whereupon words of reproach or indeed any other sudden provocation,
the parties come to blows, and a combat ensues, no undue advantage being taken
or sought on either side: if death ensue, this amounts to manslaughter. And here
it matters not what the cause be, whether real or imagined, or who draws or strikes
first: provided the occasion be sudden, and not urged as a cloak for pre-existing
nialice."
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men carried swords or other deadly weapons and the doctrine that
one must "retreat to the wall" before a slaying could be excused as
self-defense was in full sway in the law, a great deal of time and space
is devoted to these problems in the works of these authors.10 Numer-
ous cases are given to show the distinction between self-defense, man-
slaughter, and murder where homicide occurred in the course of a
sword fight.10 1 These cases have little practical value today, but the
division which they have created m the law of provocation still per-
sists. Perkins has five sub-heads under the heading of adequate provo-
cation in his outline, words, gestures, assault, battery, and mutual
quarrel or combat.1 0 2  In, these five headings we may well find the
survival of most of the elements that constituted Coke's chance medley
Although Coke seems to recognize but one form of provocation, by
Hale's time other forms of provocation had grown up. Among these
was trespass to property Trespass as used here means a bare trespass
on property, real or personal, and is not to be considered as the un-
lawful act of trespass. 10 3 Certainly the property minded common law
judges would not hold the defense of one's person in higher esteem
than the defense of one's property Thus it was not long after tres-
pass to one's person, sudden affray, had been established as adequate
provocation to mitigate murder to manslaughter, that trespass to one's
property appeared as such provocation. Hale gives examples of tres-
pass on real property as mitigation of homicide to manslaughter,O
t
and states, "If a man comes to take my goods as a trespasser, I may
justify the beating of him in defense of my goods, as hath been said;
but if I kill him, it is manslaughter."10 Foster seems not to be so
much in sympathy with the doctrine of trespass on property as pro-
vocation, but nevertheless he states that if one finds a trespasser on
his land and in the first transport of his passion beats him and un-
luckily kills him it is only manslaughter, but cites Hale as authority
and quickly adds that if a deadly weapon or unreasonable force is
used it will be murder.100 Bevell states that one who kills in abuse of
110 HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 452-453, 467-470, 478-485; FosrR, op. cit. supra
note 25 at 273-278.
101 Ibid.
10 Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 413-421.
113 HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 485-486.
See: Wilner, Untintentional Homicide in the Commission of an Unlawful Act
(1939) 87 U. of PA. L. REV. 811. ;-ej
101 HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 440, 444-445, 485-486.
"c HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 486.
10o FOSTER, op. cit. supra note 25 at 291.
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his right to defend a house is guilty of manslaughter only 107 Russell 0 8
and East 1o cite Hale and hold that trespass on one's land may be
sufficient provocation to make a homicide resulting from such trespass
11o more than manslaughter. It would seem that trespass to property
had been firmly established as sufficient provocation in the nineteenth
century, but Stephen differs. In setting out those acts which will not
constitute provocation Stephen lists specifically "injuries to prop-
erty "11 This seems to be a misstatement of the law and probably
represents Stephen's personal feeling on the subject. Perkins states
that aggravated trespass on a dwelling house may be sufficient provoca-
tion to reduce murder to manslaughter and cites fairly recent cases
holding trespass to property to be such provocation."' 1 Thus it would
seem that Stephen spoke as a humanitarian rather than a judge when
he made his statement that injury to property was not provocation, but
the law has traveled far from the views of Hale on the subject and
trespass to property, real or personal, as adequate provocation to re-
duce murder to manslaughter seems to be passing out of the criminal
law
There were acts other than trespass on the slayer's person or prop-
crty which constituted adequate provocation in Hale's time. These
acts still constitute adequate provocation and several new acts have
been added to the list. The first and most frequently noted of these
provocations is that of a husband detecting his wife m the act of
adultery, which a judge in Hale's time stated was the greatest of pro-
vocation and therefore admonished the executioner to burn the slay-
er s hand gently 1i2 This doctrine has been extended to include any
near female relative of the slayer. 1 3  Stephen added to the list the
sight of the act of sodamy on the slayer's son' 14 and Perkins has added
seduction of the slayer's infant daughter."3  Closely allied with this
prblem is the question of whether or not the act constituting the pro-
vocation in the case of an assault, battery and mutual combat must be
167 BFVILL, Op. cit. S11pra note 87 at 67-70.
In the preface to his book Bevill states, "I have given a distinct explanation of
the law upon Manslaughter, in all its branches: this, I believe, has not been hith-
erto attempted; and as far as depends upon the law, I trust that I have succeeded
in explaining the precise distinctions between that offence and Murder."
lhe book fails short of the expectations of its author.
RUSSELL. op. cit. supra note 79 at 519.
EAST, op. Cit. supra note 79 at 236.
STrEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 58 at 165.
"' Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 421-422.
,: HALE. op. cit. supra note 6 at 486, m. (d).
Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 422.
.. STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 58 at 165; See also, RUSSELL, op. cit. supra note
79 at 581.
1X1 Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 422.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
against the slayer or may the slayer act m defense of relatives or
friends. Royley's Case"16 was an example of provocation where the
assault and battery had been against the slayer's son, and other cases
have been cited by Hale and Foster where it has been held to be only
manslaughter when a servant comes to the aid of his master.117
Stephen states the proposition well when he said:
"Provocation to a person by an actual assault, or by a
mutual combat, or by a false imprisonment, is in some cases provoca-
tion to those who are with that person at the time, and to his friends
who, in the case of mutual combat, take part in the fight for his
defense. But it is uncertain how far this pnnciple extends.""'
The exact place that illegal arrest occupied m the law of man-
slaughter during this period is not altogether clear. Stephen states
that an unlawful arrest will be adequate provocation to the person
arrested but not to a bystander n 9 The cases given by Hale and Fos-
ter do not make it clear whether a homicide occurring in the course of
an illegal arrest was manslaughter because the false arrest constituted
adequate provocation or for reasons unrelated to the question of pro-
vocation. But there are a sufficient number of cases to be found to
justify the statement that an unlawful arrest will constitute adequate
provocation.
2 0
IPerkihs attempts to show that there is mitigation other than pro-
vocation and cites a few modern cases which seem to support this
idea.i 21 Whether there is mitigation other than provocation does not
concern us here since it seems to be a new idea in the law There is
nothing in the early writings and cases on the subject of manslaughter
which indicate to the writer that such a problem was even considered
before the early part of the twentieth century
Thus far all the cases considered have involved voluntary man-
slaughter, that is, the slayer intended to commit the homicide but the
circumstances were such as to allow the crime to be mitigated from
murder to manslaughter. If we disregard mitigation other than pro-
vocation, and historically it must be ignored, we find only cases
involving provocation falling under the head of voluntary manslaugh-
ter. We now turn to involuntary manslaughter which may be divided
uO 12 Co. 87" Cr. Jac. 296; 79 Eng. Rep. 254 (1611).
"r, HALE, Op. cit. supra note 6 at 484, 446; FosTER, op. cit. supra note 25 at
312-315.
""' STEPHEN, Op. cit. supra note 58 at 168-169.
'1 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 58 at 165.
1- HALE, Op. cit. supra note 6 at 457-459, 490; FosTER, op. cit. supra note 25 at
271, 311, 312, 318.
'
21 Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 426.
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into two general divisions, first, homicide resulting from an unlawful
act, and second, homicide resulting from criminal negligence. In-
voluntary manslaughter poses one of the most difficult problems m
the criminal law Here the fact that manslaughter is a catch all phrase,
under which a great unrelated mass of unexcusable and unjustifiable
homicides which are not committed with malice aforethought are
listed, is most clearly demonstrated.
From the time of Hale the degree of culpability of homicide occur-
ring in the course of an unlawful act depended on the nature of the
unlawful act. If the act was malum -n se the homicide was murder
or manslaughter according to the degree of violence involved or prob-
ability of death resulting from the act. If the unlawful act was a mere
trespass or malum prohibitum the homicide was either manslaughter
or excusable as misadventure according to the degree of danger in-
volved and the manner in which the act was committed.122  If the
unlawful act amounted to a felony the homicide was murder,12 3 but it
did not follow that if the unlawful act was only a misdemeanor the
homicide was manslaughter. These principals can best be illustrated
by giving a few of the case cited by the various authors.
The classic example of homicide in the course of an unlawful act
was given by Coke 12 4 and it has been repeated by later authors. 125
If A shoots B's fowl with the felonious intent to steal it, but by acci-
dent kills C, A is guilty of murder, but if A had no intention of stealing
B's poultry it will barely be manslaughter. But even as to this classic
example there is some disagreement, because Hale believed the slayer
would be guilty only of manslaughter even though he had intent to
steal the fowl because the unlawful act was not of a malicious
nature.1
2 11
If one unlawfully intended to injure another, as throwing a stone at
him, and death results from such an act it is manslaughter because
even though the unlawful act was malum in se it was not such an act
as would ordinarily be calculated to result in death.
1 2 7
If there was a statute prohibiting a person of less than certain
wealth or position from possessing a gun and A, in violation of this
'= HALF op. cit. supra note 6 at 475-476; FOSTER, op. cit supra note 25 at 258-
259; STLPHEN. op. cit. supra note 58 at 162-163; IV BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note
25 at 192.
a FosTER, op. cit. supra note 25 at 258; STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 58 at 164.
'- COKE, op. cit. supra note 16 at 56.
'-z HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 475; Fos'rER, op. cit. supra note 25 at 258-259;
SrEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 58 at 164.
'" HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 475.
' HALE. op. cit. supra note 6 at 472, but see 39, 475; FOSTER, op. cit. supra note
25 at 259-261; STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 58 at 162-163.
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statute, accidently kills B while hunting, he is only guilty of man
slaughter because the unlawful act was maluin prohibitium.t'.25
Where a homicide occurred in the course of a sporting contest
whether the slayer was guilty .of manslaughter or was excused de-
pended upon whether or not the sporting event was lawful. If the
sporting contest was lawful the homicide was held to be merely per
infortunium and the slayer excused.'
2 9
The common law of England was much concerned with avoiding
breaches of the King's peace and the early writers dwell at some
length on riots, sedition, resisting of sheriffs' posses, and confederating
to commit a breach of the peace.'3 0 In all of these cases involving
what might be termed mass violence, it will be noted that the partici-
pants were held guilty of murder and not manslaughter, where a homi-
cide resulted in the course of their unlawful act. One case cited by
Hale is of interest in that a homicide resulting from an assault on a
house by twenty persons, the house being defended by thirty persons,
was held to be manslaughter because there was said to be sudden
provocation.13 ' This would indicate that the early judges were not
willing to hold that a homicide resulting from a violent unlawful act
was less than murder, but were willing to distort the facts in order to
reduce murder to manslaughter where the circumstances did not justify
a conviction for murder.
Where a homicide occurred in the course of an unlawful act it was
necessary to show that the homicide occurred in pursuance of the un-
lawful purpose in order to hold those participating in the unlawful
scheme for murder or manslaughter. This principle is well illustrated
by Plummers Case13" where a band of smugglers were resisting the
king's officers and one of the smugglers killed an accomplice. It was
held that if the jury found that the homicide was the result of a pre-
conceived malice by the slayer against the deceased, then the slayer
alone could be held for murder and his confederates were not guilty
121 HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 475; FOSTER, op. cit. supra note 25 at 259.
- COKE, op. cit. supra note 16 at 56; HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 473; FOSTER,
op. cit. supra note 25 at 259; EAST, op. cit. supra note 79 at 268-271.
"A tilt or tournament, the martial diversion of our ancestors, was however an
unlawful act; and so are boxing and swordplaying, the succeeding amusements of
their posterity; and therefore, if a knight in the former case, or a gladiator in the
latter, be killed, such killing is felony of manslaughter. But, if the king command
or permit such diversions it is said to be only misadventure; for then the act is
lawful."
IV BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 25 at 183.
"o HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 442; IV BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 25 at
200. See: Riot Act, 1 Geo. 1, C. 5 (1714).
" Case of Drayton Basset, HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 444.
"9 12 Mod. 627, 88 Eng. Rep. 1565 (1701).
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bcause the homicide did not occur in pursuance of their unlawful
smnuggling scheme.
Having considered briefly what the early writers considered to be
the law relative to homicide committed in the course of an unlawful
act, we now turn and compare these views with the present day lav
as stated by Perkins. In discussing involuntary manslaughter occur-
ring in the course of an unlawful act Perkins has considered the prob-
lem under two general headings, "The nature of the unlawful act,"
33
and "Causal relation between the unlawful act and death."134 In con-
sidering the nature of the unlawful act Perkins states that if the act
is maluin in se the homicide is not excusable, but will be murder or
manslaughter, in the absence of a statutory excuse,135 regardless of the
element of human risk involved.1 3 6 If the unlawful act is malum pro-
hibitum only, the homicide will be manslaughter, only if the act is done
wilfully or so recklessly as to amount to criminal negligence, otherwise
the homicide is excusable.' 37 Thus it would seem that the law has
progressed little since the time of Foster who stated
"For if the act be unlawful, I mean if it be malum in se,
the case will amount to felony, either murder or manslaughter, as the
circumstances may vary the nature of it. If it be done in prosecution
of a felomous intention it will be murder, but if the intent went no
further than to commit a bare trespass, manslaughter.'
Perkins states that there must be a casual connection between the
death and the unlawful act in order to hold the slayer guilty of culpable
homicide. As we have seen Plummer's Case 39 establishes that even
in Hale's time there must be some casual relation between the homicide
and the purpose of the unlawful act in order to hold the slayer guilty
of manslaughter in the course of an unlawful act. Here again it is
shown that the law as laid down by Hale three centuries ago is ap-
plicable today
In discussing the second subdivision of involuntary manslaughter,
criminal negligence amounting to manslaughter, we will not attempt
to trace the crime to its root or attempt to draw any fine distinctions
' Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 428.
'' Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 430.
21 Edw. 1. st. 2 (1292) provided that if a forester, parker, or warrener found
a trespasser in the forest and the trespasser would not yield or stand to the king's
peace when the hue and cry was made then the forester was excused if he killed
the trespasser.
This indicates that statutory excuses for homicides which would otherwise be
murder or manslaughter are not new in the law.
'- Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 429.
'c Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 430.
'' FOSTER, op. cit. supra note 25 at 258.
12 Mod. 627, 88 Eng. Rep. 1565 (1701).
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between what degrees of criminal negligence will be required to con-
stitute murder or manslaughter. We will merely give a brief history
in very broad and general terms.
Criminal negligence is a refinement growing out of per mnfortumuni
which, as has been indicated, was excusable homicide resulting from
accident or misadventure. 40 Whether or not criminal negligence
existed in Coke's time does not concern us here,1 4 1 but it is clear that
it had emerged as a distinct criminal act by the time of Hale. 4 2 In
this discussion we will consider homicide by accident to be that act
described by Foster when he stated:
"This species of homicide is where a man is doing a lawful
act without intention of bodily harm to any person, and using proper
caution to prevent danger, unfortunately happeneth to kill."" 3
And we will consider homicide by criminal negligence to be the failure
to use that caution.
44
With these premises in mind we turn now to the various cases
given by the writers as illustrating manslaughter resulting from crin-
nal negligence. The first and standard example of crnmnal negligence
is based on Hull's Case14 5 where a workman threw a timber from a
building and killed a man below It was stated that if the workman
knew that there was likely to be people below and he did not give
proper warning before throwing the timber, he was guilty of murder;
if a person only occasionally came near the building then the workman
must give warning before throwing the timber or he was guilty of at
least manslaughter; but if the building was so removed that no person
had ever been seen near the building and the workman threw down
the timber without warning and killed a person below then the work-
man was excused since it will be deemed that the homicide was the
140 MORELAND, A RxrONALE OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (1944) 1.
1"I Id. at 3-4.
12
4 3
HALF, op. cit., supra note 6 at 39, 472; MORELAND, op. cit. supra note 1 13 at 5.
"I FOSTER, Op. cit. supra note 25 at 258.
1" Moreland submits as a proposed definition of criminal negligence the fol-
lowing:
" (1) Criminal negligence is conduct creating such an unreasonable risk of harm
to life, safety, property-or other interest for the unintentional invasion of which the
law prescribes punishment, as to be recklessly disregardful of such interest. The
standard of conduct to be applied is that of a reasonable man under like cir-
cumstances.
(2) Criminal negligence may be either:
(a) An act which the actor as a reasonable man should realize as involving
under the circumstances a reckless disregard of an interest of others, or
(b) A failure to perform a legal duty which the actor as a reasonable man
should realize amounts to a reckless disregard for human life and safety under the
circumstances."
:45 Kel. 40, 84 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1644).
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result of misadventure. This is the example given by most of the
writerssO and may well be considered the best historical illustration of
the varying degrees of criminal and non-crmial negligence.
The correction of a child by his parent or a servant by his master
was a lawful act and if death resulted from such correction the homi-
cide was excusable as per rnfortunium.147  But if it were shown that
unreasonable or excessive force was used or that a dangerous or deadly
weapon was used in the correction, the slayer was guilty of at least
manslaughter48 For example, in a case cited by East 149 a son had
been guilty of frequent thefts and when a new theft was reported to
his father, the father, in a rage, beat the son with a rope causing his
death. This was held to be manslaughter.
The wilful neglect of a dangerous beast, known to be likely to cause
harm, which escapes and kills an innocent person, was an example of
criminal negligence amounting to manslaughter cited by early
writers.'r,0
In addition to these special examples cited, numerous other cases
were given by these writers. Many of these cases present interesting
and unusual problems such as Sir John Chichester's Casei51 where a
master killed a favorite servant while playing and Rampton's Case
52
where a husband accidently shot his wife with a pistol which he had
found, believing it not to be loaded. A general review of these cases
indicates when in the course of human affairs a homicide occurred
unexpectedly and without intent of the slayer, he was guilty of at
least manslaughter if he failed to use that degree of care which was
'i HALE, Op. cit. supra note 6 at 472; IV BLACKSTONE, op. cit. sulpra note 25 at
192. See- SIEPHEN, Op. cit. supra note 58 at 163.
Hale cites another iluustration of the degrees of criminal negligence. If A
drives his cart over a child intentionally and kills the child it is murder; if A drives
us cart in such a reckless manner that the child was killed but the death could have
heen avoided but for A's reckless driving, it is manslaughter, and if A is driving
along the street and a child dashes in front of his cart and is killed it is misadven-
ture only.
HALr, op. cit. supra note 6 at 476.
1,7 HALE, Op. cit. supra note 6 at 45.4, 473-474; FOSTER. Op. cit. supra note 25
at 262.
Ibid.
i49 EAST, op. cit. supra note 79 at 261.
HALr, op. cit. supra note 6 at 431.
It was noted that under the Mosaic Law the owner of an ox, known to have
gored a man in the past, failed to safely keep the ox and it killed a man suffered
death.
Exodus XXI, 29.
" Keilw. 108; 72 Eng. Rep. 273 (1508).
i'-Kel. .11, 84 Eng. Rep. 1073 (1664).
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proportionate to the probability of death resulting from his acts.153
Perkins does not dwell at length with manslaughter resulting from
criminal negligence 5 4 and his brief discussion adds little to what the
writers already considered have to say on the problem. We have not
attempted here to analyze criminal negligence amounting to man-
slaughter, but merely attempted to show that this type of manslaughter
has been recognized in its present day meaning since the time of Hale.
The most striking fact to be perceived from this survey of the crime
of manslaughter from Bracton to today is the lack of any substantial
change in the law since the time of Hale. Viewed historically, the
crime of manslaughter may be divided generally into two principal
categories; first, voluntary manslaughter which include the cases in-
volving provocation and heat and passion; second, involuntary man-
slaughter which can be subdivided into two parts, first homicide
occurring in the course of a non violent unlawful act, second, homicide
resulting from a degree of criminal negligence. This categorization is
the same as that given by Perkins and seems to be historically sound.
'r' HALE, op. cit. supra note 6 at 40, 430-431, 454, 457, 472, 476; FOSTER, Op. cit.
supra note 25 at 260, 263, 292, 299; STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 58 at 163-164; IV
BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 25 at 182-183, 192.
211 Perkins, op. cit. supra note 3 at 434.
